Cybersecurity
Malicious GitHub Actions workflows spread through compromised accounts
Researchers said attackers used compromised maintainer accounts to seed a credential-stealing GitHub Actions workflow across hundreds of repositories, while later reports placed the campaign at far larger scale.
- StepSecurity said Takashi Kitao's account was used to push the workflow to 27 repositories, and Henry Wu's account was used to push it to 318 more.
- Socket said it had identified more than 500 GitHub accounts that had committed the workflow to tens of thousands of repositories since 7 October 2026.
- GitGuardian said GhostAction had pushed the workflow to 772 public repositories across 373 GitHub users and organisations between 31 August and 30 September 2026.
- The workflow sent collected data to 193.32.204[.]199 over HTTP and searched repositories for secrets in the working tree and git history.
Researchers said an ongoing credential-theft campaign had used compromised maintainer accounts to add a malicious GitHub Actions workflow to repositories. StepSecurity said Takashi Kitao's account was used first, then Henry Wu's account eight hours later.
StepSecurity said Kitao's account pushed the workflow to 27 repositories, while Wu's account pushed the same file to 318 repositories in a 16-minute window. Socket said it had identified more than 500 GitHub accounts that had committed the workflow to tens of thousands of repositories since 7 October 2026.
The workflow was called Security Audit or GitHub Actions Security, and it sent data to 193.32.204[.]199 over plain HTTP. The collected material could include named GitHub Actions secrets, credentials in the working tree and credentials preserved in the full git history.
GitGuardian said GhostAction had earlier reached 772 public repositories across 373 GitHub users and organisations between 31 August and 30 September 2026. In one case on 30 August 2026, attackers modified kuafuai/DevOpsGPT to place an XMRig miner in the project's Docker image.
Researchers advised checking repositories for either workflow since 31 August 2026, revoking affected credentials, removing the workflow from all branches and reviewing forks. Socket said private forks and downstream mirrors were especially exposed because enabled Actions could trigger further harvesting.
Named in this story
People
- Takashi Kitao
- his GitHub account was used to push the workflow to 27 repositories
- Henry Wu
- his GitHub account was used to push the workflow to 318 repositories
Companies
- StepSecurity
- said compromised accounts were used to push the workflow
- Socket
- said it had identified more than 500 affected GitHub accounts
- GitGuardian
- reported earlier spread of the same campaign
Products and systems
- GhostAction
- the campaign linked to the workflow injections
- pyxel
- the game engine authored by Takashi Kitao
- athenadriver
- the project originally authored by Henry Wu
- kuafuai/DevOpsGPT
- the repository altered to embed XMRig
- XMRig
- the cryptocurrency miner added to the Docker image
How the source tells it
The register was factual but alarmed, with repeated threat labels and a closing run of urgent remediation advice.
- alarm loaded campaign language and repeated references to malicious compromise
- urgency direct instructions to revoke credentials, remove workflows and inspect forks