Cybersecurity
Compromised ConnectWise credential reached 173 Microsoft 365 tenants
Huntress and Todyl said a compromised ConnectWise Cloud Backup credential was used to access customer Microsoft 365 tenants, while Microsoft and Google-linked researchers separately described another supply-chain tampering campaign.
- Huntress said it had confirmed unauthorised sign-ins in 173 partner and customer tenants using a compromised ConnectWise Cloud Backup credential.
- Jonathan Semon said the credential was used to obtain Microsoft Graph tokens from 144.172.64.128 between 06:13 and 08:34 UTC on 15 October 2026.
- Huntress and Todyl said the app's inherited permissions could expose mailboxes, files, chats and directory data, and Todyl said already issued tokens could stay valid for up to 90 minutes.
- ConnectWise said it had shut off Cloud Backup access and found no evidence that partner backup data had been compromised.
- Microsoft said it was tracking the attack and advised defenders to review service principal sign-ins, app credential changes and OAuth grants.
Huntress said it had confirmed unauthorised sign-ins in 173 partner and customer tenants through a compromised ConnectWise Cloud Backup credential. Jonathan Semon said the credential was used to obtain Microsoft Graph tokens from 144.172.64[.]128 on 15 October 2026, between 06:13 and 08:34 UTC, and that the pattern suggested scripted targeting.
Huntress said the app's permissions let an attacker reach mailboxes, OneDrive, SharePoint, Teams and directory data in every tenant where it was installed and consented. Todyl said it had seen an unauthorised party authenticate as the same app, and Nicholas Koken said revoking user sessions would not stop already issued tokens.
Huntress said a separate ConnectWise Cloud Management app for Microsoft Teams added itself to the Global Administrator role in one partner tenant and then changed two other applications by adding new client secrets. Semon said that could widen access beyond a single tenant because MSP tools are often consented into customer environments.
ConnectWise said it had shut off Cloud Backup application access while its investigation and remediation continued, and said it had found no evidence that partner backup data had been compromised. Microsoft said it was tracking the attack and told defenders to review service principal sign-ins, app credential changes and OAuth grants.
In a separate development, Google's Mandiant, Google Threat Intelligence Group and ManageEngine Threat Analysis Lab said they had seen brief tampering of AOMEI Backupper update infrastructure between April and July 2026. They said the changes redirected downloads to a malicious ZIP file that delivered CROSSROAD and SHINYROAD, and they attributed the campaign to UNC7017.
Named in this story
People
- Jonathan Semon
- the Huntress researcher who described the sign-in pattern
- Nicholas Koken
- the Todyl detection engineering lead who explained the permissions
Companies
- Huntress
- the security firm that observed the sign-ins and issued warnings
- Todyl
- the security company that said it saw unauthorised Microsoft Graph access
- ConnectWise
- the company that shut off access and said its response was ongoing
- Microsoft
- the company that said it was tracking the attack and recommended reviews
Organisations
- Mandiant
- one of the groups that reported the AOMEI update tampering
- Google Threat Intelligence Group
- one of the groups that reported the AOMEI update tampering
- ManageEngine Threat Analysis Lab
- one of the groups that reported the AOMEI update tampering
- UNC7017
- the threat cluster attributed with the AOMEI campaign
Products and systems
- ConnectWise Cloud Backup (formerly SkyKick)
- the backup app whose credential was compromised
- Microsoft 365
- the tenant environment targeted by the activity
- Microsoft Graph
- the API used to obtain tokens and reach customer data
- ConnectWise Cloud Management
- the app that reportedly elevated itself and altered other applications in one tenant
- AOMEI Backupper
- the backup software whose update infrastructure was tampered with
- CROSSROAD
- the downloader payload delivered in the malicious ZIP
- SHINYROAD
- the backdoor framework delivered by the campaign
How the source tells it
The article used urgent, alarm-heavy security reporting, emphasising broad exposure and immediate remediation.
- alarm the opening warning language and repeated hostile-access framing cast the incident as an immediate danger
- urgency the piece pressed readers towards immediate checks, log review and disabling access until credentials were reset
- threat inflation it repeatedly widened the apparent scope by describing tenant-wide exposure and multiple data classes