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Cybersecurity

Compromised ConnectWise credential reached 173 Microsoft 365 tenants

Huntress and Todyl said a compromised ConnectWise Cloud Backup credential was used to access customer Microsoft 365 tenants, while Microsoft and Google-linked researchers separately described another supply-chain tampering campaign.

The Hacker News

Huntress said it had confirmed unauthorised sign-ins in 173 partner and customer tenants through a compromised ConnectWise Cloud Backup credential. Jonathan Semon said the credential was used to obtain Microsoft Graph tokens from 144.172.64[.]128 on 15 October 2026, between 06:13 and 08:34 UTC, and that the pattern suggested scripted targeting.

Huntress said the app's permissions let an attacker reach mailboxes, OneDrive, SharePoint, Teams and directory data in every tenant where it was installed and consented. Todyl said it had seen an unauthorised party authenticate as the same app, and Nicholas Koken said revoking user sessions would not stop already issued tokens.

Huntress said a separate ConnectWise Cloud Management app for Microsoft Teams added itself to the Global Administrator role in one partner tenant and then changed two other applications by adding new client secrets. Semon said that could widen access beyond a single tenant because MSP tools are often consented into customer environments.

ConnectWise said it had shut off Cloud Backup application access while its investigation and remediation continued, and said it had found no evidence that partner backup data had been compromised. Microsoft said it was tracking the attack and told defenders to review service principal sign-ins, app credential changes and OAuth grants.

In a separate development, Google's Mandiant, Google Threat Intelligence Group and ManageEngine Threat Analysis Lab said they had seen brief tampering of AOMEI Backupper update infrastructure between April and July 2026. They said the changes redirected downloads to a malicious ZIP file that delivered CROSSROAD and SHINYROAD, and they attributed the campaign to UNC7017.

Named in this story

People

Jonathan Semon
the Huntress researcher who described the sign-in pattern
Nicholas Koken
the Todyl detection engineering lead who explained the permissions

Companies

Huntress
the security firm that observed the sign-ins and issued warnings
Todyl
the security company that said it saw unauthorised Microsoft Graph access
ConnectWise
the company that shut off access and said its response was ongoing
Microsoft
the company that said it was tracking the attack and recommended reviews

Organisations

Mandiant
one of the groups that reported the AOMEI update tampering
Google Threat Intelligence Group
one of the groups that reported the AOMEI update tampering
ManageEngine Threat Analysis Lab
one of the groups that reported the AOMEI update tampering
UNC7017
the threat cluster attributed with the AOMEI campaign

Products and systems

ConnectWise Cloud Backup (formerly SkyKick)
the backup app whose credential was compromised
Microsoft 365
the tenant environment targeted by the activity
Microsoft Graph
the API used to obtain tokens and reach customer data
ConnectWise Cloud Management
the app that reportedly elevated itself and altered other applications in one tenant
AOMEI Backupper
the backup software whose update infrastructure was tampered with
CROSSROAD
the downloader payload delivered in the malicious ZIP
SHINYROAD
the backdoor framework delivered by the campaign

How the source tells it

The article used urgent, alarm-heavy security reporting, emphasising broad exposure and immediate remediation.

  • alarm the opening warning language and repeated hostile-access framing cast the incident as an immediate danger
  • urgency the piece pressed readers towards immediate checks, log review and disabling access until credentials were reset
  • threat inflation it repeatedly widened the apparent scope by describing tenant-wide exposure and multiple data classes